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REINVENTING A SECURITY: ARGUMENTS FOR A
PUBLIC INTEREST DEFINITION
ERic A. CHIAPPINELLI*
In February 1992, the American Stock Exchange sought Securities and
Exchange Commission' approval to introduce Standard & Poor's Depositary
Receipts (SPDR's), a new investment vehicle designed to allow individuals
to invest easily in the benchmark Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Stock
Price Index (S&P 500).2 Currently, investors can buy stock in each of the
500 companies,3 invest in mutual funds that hold S&P 500 stocks, buy
options on the S&P 500, or buy S&P 500 futures.
Each of these alternatives has its drawbacks. To buy a properly weighted
portfolio of all S&P 500 stocks costs millions of dollars, not including
commissions. It is also difficult to purchase or dispose of stock in 500
companies contemporaneously. Mutual funds charge fees, either on the
purchase or sale of shares or periodically. Options do not pay the dividends
declared on the underlying stock during the option period and expire, at
the longest, in three months. Futures have the same limitations as options
and, by definition, derive their value not simply from the underlying S&P
500 index but from traders' expectations of the value of the index at
expiration.
Although the mechanics of SPDR's are complex, the idea behind them
is simple.4 After the October 1987 equity markets crash, investors have
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. Copyright
0 1992, Eric A. Chiappinelli. My thanks to Barbara A. West. Gail McMonagle performed
exemplary research assistance.
1. Hereinafter "SEC" or the "Commission."
2. SPDR Trust Series 1, Form S-6, at 3 (Feb. 28, 1992); Robert Steiner, New Amex
'Spiders' Mimic S&P Index, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1992, at Cl. Investors want to invest in
the S&P 500 because it allows them to diversify their holdings and ensures a return on their
investment that matches the market return as a whole. Id.
3. The S&P 500 is a value weighted index. To replicate the index, an investor cannot
simply purchase an equal dollar amount of each company's stock nor an equal number of
shares in each company. Rather, he or she must allocate to each stock the same proportion
of his or her total investment as each stock's total market value bears to the aggregate market
value of all 500 stocks. JAM.S H. LoPam ET AL., Tim STocic MARKET: TnmoRIEs AND EVIDENCE
41-49 (2d ed. 1985).
4. SPDR's are interests in a trust that holds properly weighted S&P 500 stocks as its
corpus. SPDR's will trade on the floor of the American Stock Exchange using the specialist
system, just as any other listed stock trades. The trust is divided into enough units so that
each SPDR should trade at about 1/10th of the S&P 500 index, currently about $40 per
SPDR. Each quarter, the trust will declare a dividend equal to the dividends paid on each
stock during the preceding quarter, less a fee of 2/10 of 1%. To avoid the problem of SPDR's
trading at a discount to the value of the trust's stock, a problem often found with closed end
mutual funds, the American Stock Exchange will allow large traders to engage in arbitrage
activities with the trust. Large investors will be able to exchange 50,000 SPDR's for a properly
weighted basket of S&P 500 stocks or, conversely, exchange a basket of stocks for SPDR's.
In this way, arbitrage activity should keep the SPDR price in line with the S&P 500, within
a relatively small variation. Steiner, supra note 2, at Cl.
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shown increasing interest in vehicles that replicate the markets' performance.
The wonder is not that the American Stock Exchange introduced SPDRs
but that it took them so long to do so. It was not for lack of trying.
Three years before SPDRs, in 1989 Judge Easterbrook faced a dilemma.
After SEC approval, the American Stock Exchange and other exchanges
had introduced Index Participations (IPs), a new investment vehicle designed
to allow individuals to invest easily in the S&P 500.5 Because IPs resembled
stock but also resembled a futures contract, a futures exchange brought suit
to stop trading in IPs on the ground that only the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction over futures contracts. 6 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's task, Judge
Easterbrook wrote, was to "decide whether tetrahedrons belong in square
or round holes." ' 7 After fourteen pages of analysis, he sided with the futures
exchange and CFTC. SPDRs are the exchanges' response to Judge Easter-
brook. They are the next tetrahedrons.'
Although the question whether IPs were securities may have been
evanescent, 9 their reincarnation as SPDRs shows that coverage is easily the
most enduring and recurring fundamental question in securities regulation.
To what instruments do the securities laws apply? Since the October 1987
crash new investment vehicles have proliferated. Over the next decade many
more instruments' o worth many trillions of dollars" will be brought to
market. All of them present the question whether the securities laws apply.
5. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Listing and Trading of
Index Participations, Exchange Act Release No. 26,709, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,280, at 15,290 n.96
(1989) [hereinafter Index Participation Rule Change]. An IP was a contract of indefinite
duration that obligated the seller (called the short) to pay to the buyer (called the long) at the
long's option the value of an index of securities such as the S&P 500. The short's obligation
to pay could only be enforced once (at which point the contract ended) and only enforced on
one of a series of periodic cash-out dates, usually quarterly. Each quarter, until the contract
ended, the short paid the approximate value of the dividends paid by the stocks in the index
over the preceding quarter. IPs were fully negotiable and a clearinghouse was interposed
between the shorts and longs so that obligations ran between the short and the clearinghouse
and between the clearinghouse and the long. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537,
539-40 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990).
6. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 540.
7. Id. at 539.
8. For an analysis of SPDRs under both the traditional and public interest analyses,
see infra text accompanying note 169.
9. Although the Supreme Court denied review, Congress occasionally has considered
reversing the result in Chicago Mercantile Exchange by switching jurisdiction over hybrid
instruments containing elements of both securities and futures. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Futures
BillAgreement Is Expected, N.Y. TiMEs, July 27, 1990, at Dl; Nathaniel C. Nash, Compromise
on Regulation of Index Futures Advances, N.Y. TIM-s, July 28, 1990, at 29; cf. Kevin G.
Salwen, SEC Is Attempting To Develop a Plan For New Oversight, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
1991, at C6.
10. See Jeffrey Taylor, A Boom Year for Newfangled Trading Vehicles, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 26, 1991, at 13.
11. In 1991 alone, the total dollar volume of securitized loans, only one kind of new
vehicle, was estimated at $299,000,000,000. Richard L. Stern & Jason Zweig, Bank Reform
Wall Street Style, FORBES, Mar. 30, 1992, at 62.
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The most salient consequences of coverage are registration and antifraud
protection. If an instrument is covered by the securities laws, it must be
registered with the SEC unless an exemption can be found. Issuers are
subject to severe civil liabilities for failing to register vehicles that, in
retrospect, are determined to be securities. 2 If an offering of a new
instrument must be registered, the cost can easily run to $350,000 or more.
13
Moreover, if an instrument is a security, the antifraud protections attach,
even if it is exempt from registration. Those provisions impose liability
upon a purchaser or seller who knowingly or recklessly commits fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
The statutory starting places for the definition of "security," section
2(1) of the Securities Act of 193314 and section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,1- with minor variations begin by enumerating myriad
paradigms.' 6 They then move to more tenuous variations,' 7 and finally
culminate with the inclusion of "in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security."""
The short answer to the question "What is a security?" is a law
professor's dream: a security is anything that ought to be one.'9 The Supreme
Court has consistently reaffirmed that Congress's intention was to extend
coverage to any "investment. ' 20 The touchstone, said the Court, is whether
investors need protection through the disclosure requirements of the Secu-
rities Act or through the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. 2' The
most theoretical scholar to examine the question sees the definition of
security as comprising both specific, reified paradigms such as stock, and
instruments possessing attributes that Congress believed belonged to "se-
curities."22
This traditional approach to securities laws coverage has been criticized
as unpredictable.Y A more important problem is that coverage turns entirely
12. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Koscot Interplan-
etary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. RicHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SEcUrITIS REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 141 (6th ed. 1987).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988) [hereinafter the Securities Act].
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78gg (1988) [hereinafter the Exchange Act].
16. E.g., note, stock, treasury stock, bond, and debenture.
17. E.g., collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-
able share, and investment contract.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(10) (1988).
19. Professor Chang has defined the problem of defining a security as "self-referencing."
Williamson B.C. Chang, Meaning, Reference, and Reification in the Definition of a Security,
19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 403, 421-22 n.92 (1986). He states his conception of the problem as
"[the very nature of the concept of a security is that it triggers the application of the securities
acts. In other words, we know what the securities acts are by knowing what securities are."
Id. at 415. Chang describes the problem as a lack of "fair warning" and predictability which
allows judges to consider the merits of the case before the act is applied. Id.
20. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945, 949 (1990).
21. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985).
22. Chang, supra note 19, at 415.
23. See, e.g., THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 24 n.19 (2d ed.
19921
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on the private needs of private investors rather than on the public needs of
the national securities markets. The current analysis does not consider the
American capital formation and secondary trading markets or those markets'
ability to compete with foreign markets. As the number and variety of new
investment vehicles increases over the next few years, the problem of deciding
which are covered by the securities laws will become more acute. In other
words, the current answer to the question "What is a security?" is too
narrow because it excludes some'instruments that should be securities.
Continuing to ignore that national interest will exacerbate the indeter-
minacy of securities coverage analysis because the new, sophisticated in-
vestment vehicles are not easily amenable to the traditional analysis. Unless
securities coverage is tied to protecting the national markets, those markets
and the American economy will be at risk.
An economic concern with the financial markets is only one reason to
change the analysis of securities coverage. Since the October 1987 crash,
federal regulators have focused on rationalizing the markets' regulation.
Moreover, protecting the larger public interest in the financial markets was
part of Congress's intention at least as early as 1934 and as late as 1987.
Further, in terms of theoretical harmony, a consideration of the markets
would not displace the traditional analysis. Instead, it would provide a
useful supplement to that approach.
I. Ti CURRENT APPROACH
The current approach to securities laws coverage derives from about a
dozen Supreme Court cases. Some involved the relatively concrete "stock"
' '
and "notes"' 5 and the more plastic "investment contract.1 26 Other Supreme
Court cases considered not the inclusive aspect of the definition, but the
statutory exclusions for contracts of insurance 7 and short term notes28 as
well as exclusion based on coverage by another regulatory scheme.
29
Throughout these cases the Court's decisions have been anchored to the
need to protect the purchasers of the vehicles.
The Court held that if an instrument is stock under general corporate
law principles it is always covered by the securities laws.30 Stock is always
1990); 2 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURmTES REGULATION 871 n.5 (3d ed. 1989); Scott
FitzGibbon, What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the
Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893, 894 (1980).
24. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471
U.S. 701 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
25. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
26. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
27. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
28. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 947.
29. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
30. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
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covered, the Court said, because Congress implicitly found that purchasers
of stock almost always expect the securities laws to apply. 31 That expectation
creates the need to protect purchasers generally through the disclosure and
antifraud provisions of the securities laws3 2 even if a particular purchaser
does not need or even expect the securities laws' protection.
33
A note is presumed to be a security but certain notes that are not
"investments" and other notes that bear a sufficient "family resemblance"
to them are excluded.3 4 The three "family resemblance" criteria are, said
the Court, the same as those used to decide whether any instrument is a
security.3 - They all focus on the private interests of the purchasers. First,
does the buyer desire profit and does the seller intend to use the proceeds
in a traditional capital investment sense?36 Second, is the instrument unique
to the parties or is it capable of being offered to others? 37 Third, do the
potential purchasers reasonably expect the securities laws to apply?3"
Instruments that do not fall into one of the more concrete categories
like stock or notes have usually been subjected to the Howey test for
investment contracts. 39 Like the tests for stock and notes, the investment
31. Id. at 687; Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 952; United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 834, 850 (1975).
32. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687-88.
33. Id. at 696; Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 949; Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 706 (1985);
Forman, 421 U.S. at 850. In Reves, the Court effectively clarified its holding in Landreth. It
confirmed that "the public perception of common stock as the paradigm of a security suggests
that stock, in whatever context it is sold, should be treated as within the ambit of the
[Securities] Acts." Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 949.
34. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 950. Certain short term notes are excluded by the Securities
Act § 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(3) and the Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10).
Further, a note, like any security, may not be covered by the securities laws if another
regulatory system exists.
35. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 951. The Reves Court spoke of a fourth criterion, the existence
of another regulatory scheme. Id. Another scheme of regulation would significantly reduce
"the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary."
Id. at 952.
36. Id. at 951-52.
37. Id. at 952. This criterion essentially duplicates "the common enterprise prong" of
the Howey Test. James D. Gordon III, Interplanetary Intelligence about Promissory Notes as
Securities, 69 Tax. L. Rnv. 383, 395 (1990). The Court addressed this criterion directly in
finding an agreement between two private parties regarding a loan guarantee was not intended
to be traded publicly and, therefore, was not a security under the Act. Marine Bank v. Weaver,
445 U.S. 551, 560 (1982). There, the Court distinguished Howey based on the number of
potential investors. Id.
38. This prong essentially replicates the basis for the Court's decisions in Landreth and
Forman. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 581, 587-88 (1985); United Hous. Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853-54 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (citing to Howey); SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946). In addition, other cases speak to the Howey test. E.g., Forman, 421 U.S. at 837.
"Investment contract" was a term of art when Congress enacted the Securities Acts. Howey,
328 U.S. at 298.
1992]
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contract analysis looks to the need for purchaser protection. 40 Under Howey,
an instrument is a security if it is '(1) an investment; (2) in a common
enterprise;4' (3) with a reasonable expectation of profits;42 (4) to be derived
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.' 43
Some securities have nevertheless been excluded from coverage. In those
cases the Court, again, looked to the need for investor protection. Three
cases involved statutory exceptions for certain kinds of instruments. In the
first case, 44 the Court held that the instrument was not a contract of
insurance and, without elaboration, stated that the instrument was within
the definition of a security. 45 The Court's discussion of the insurance
exception did not turn on public policy notions.46 The instrument in SEC
v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 47 the second case, was held to be an
investment contract under Joiner and Howey and not a contract of insur-
ance." Justice Harlan's opinion explicitly rested upon notions of the need
for investor protection.
49
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the third exclusion case, the respondent
relied upon the so-called commercial paper exemption." The majority found
that the statutory language was ambiguous at least as to demand notes,
40. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. The Howey test has been held to contain the thread for
all of the Court's securities coverage analysis. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
41. This is the origin of the requirement that the instrument not be unique to the parties.
This prong was the basis of Weaver's holding that because the separate contracts were not
offered at large they were not securities. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560.
42. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-59.
43. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945, 950 (1990) (citing Arthur Young & Co. v.
Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110
S. Ct. 945 (1990)).
44. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
45. Id. at 71.
46. The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan rested upon traditional investor protection
arguments. Id. at 76-91. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion is held tantamount to the
majority opinion. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 210 (1967). Compare,
though, the typically supple dissent of Justice Harlan (speaking for himself and three others)
arguing that the origin of the exception for contracts of insurance was based upon a later
discarded view that regulation of insurance was beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. Variable Annuity Life, 359 U.S. at 99 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
48. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967).
49. "It seems eminently fair that a purchaser ... be afforded the same advantages of
disclosure [under the Securities Acts] which inure to a mutual fund purchaser." Id.; cf.
Associates in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 941 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1991), in which Judge Easterbrook held an annuity to be a contract of insurance under both
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. and United Benefit Life Ins. Co. and an investment under
Howey. Judge Easterbrook's decision not to subject the annuity to the regulation of the
securities laws turned on the amount of risk the purchaser held. Id. at 565-68. No part of his
opinion turned on the public interest.
50. 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990).
51. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945, 953 (1990).
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which were involved in that case. 2 The Court resolved the ambiguity in
favor of coverage on the ground that investor protection required coverage
because the instrument could have a maturity longer than nine months.53
The Court suggested that the result might have been different had the
parties intended that the notes mature within nine months.54 In dictum, the
Court strongly suggested that the appropriate resolution of the ambiguity
was that Congress intended the exemption to apply only to commercial
paper sold only to sophisticated investors.5 -
Finally, a few other cases raised an argument that securities should be
exempt because another regulatory system exists. 56 The Court first suggested,
then held, that where another regulatory system sufficiently reduces an
instrument's risk such that purchasers do not need the protection of the
securities laws, those laws do not apply.57 For example, coverage under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) s or the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDIA) 9 vitiates the need for securities coverage. 60
II. THE CURRENT ANAYsis AND NEW VEmcLEs
The most common objection to the current analysis for securities
coverage is that it is indeterminate. As we have seen, the Court uses three
52. Id. at 955.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 954. The Chief Justice argued in dissent that the statute is not ambiguous as
to demand notes. Id. at 957-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He did not make any public policy arguments about the purpose of the statutory exemption
or securities laws coverage generally. Id. Compare Justice Stevens' concurrence on the com-
mercial paper argument ground and the Chief Justice's response to Justice Stevens. Id. at 955-
60 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); see also SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 75 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 945; Weaver, 455 U.S. at 551; International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
58. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
59. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1834b (Supp. 1992).
60. "The existence of [ERISA] ... severely undercuts all arguments for extending the
Securities Acts to non-contributory, compulsory pension plans.... Not only is the extension
of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported by the language and history of those
Acts, but in light of ERISA it serves no general purpose." Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569-70.
Similarly, in Weaver, the Court found that "[i]t is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank
certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the federal
banking laws." Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559; cf. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 953 (noting that comprehensive
regulatory schemes in Weaver and Daniel were essentially risk reducing factors that suggested
instruments were not securities); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 210 (1967)
(quoting SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. at 75 (Brennan, J., concurring) as
stating that presence of state regulation schemes for insurance made federal regulation of
insurance instruments 'even less relevant').
19921
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different methods to determine whether an instrument is a security. 6' Further,
the Court has sometimes approached the coverage question by asking
whether an instrument is something other than a security. 62 It uses yet
another criterion to decide whether a security should not be covered by the
securities laws when a competing regulatory scheme exists. 63 The point is
not that there is a welter of tests but that the Court has given little guidance
as to which test or tests should apply to a particular instrument.
For example, as early as Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. and United
Benefit the Court itself seemed uncertain whether to start its analysis by
deciding if the instrument was a security or by deciding if it was something
else. 64 In another example, the Forman case generated great confusion
because it was unclear whether the Howey test always applied, whether it
did not apply to more concrete instruments like stock, or whether it was
always available as an alternative. In the end, the Landreth Court had to
"clarify" the Court's reasoning in that area. In yet a third instance, as
recently as 1990 the Court was forced to deal with the widespread confusion
over which test to apply to notes. Four circuits used an "investment versus
commercial" test, three circuits essentially used the Howey test, and one
circuit used the "family resemblance" test.
61
This indeterminacy in choosing one test over another is compounded
by the indeterminacy within each test. Howey is obviously intended to be
open in its application and, therefore, purposefully indeterminate, but even
the tests for stock and notes are unpredictable. The Court in Forman and
Landreth wrestled with the question of which qualities define the paradigm
of stock and it deliberately finessed the question of instruments containing
some but not all of those qualities." Likewise the Reves Court had trouble
61. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990) (positing that notes may
be securities under family resemblance test); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681
(1985) (holding that stock, by its nature, is security); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946) (establishing test for investment contracts).
62. E.g., SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 68 (1958) (asserting that
analysis begins with question of whether respondents were issuing insurance contracts); United
Benefit Life, 387 U.S. at 211 (finding that instrument was not within insurance exemption
prior to holding it was security).
63. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 945; Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1981); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1978).
64. See Variable Annuity Life, 359 U.S. at 68 (noting that "[t]he common question to
the exemption provisions of the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act and to § 2(b)
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is whether respondents are issuing contracts of insurance");
cf. id. at 74 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that instrument would clearly be security
were it not for insurance exemption); id. at 95-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that
instrument contains elements of both securities and insurance contracts); see also SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211 (1967) (holding that instrument was not
insurance contract and that it was security).
65. The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits used the "investment versus commer-
cial" test, the Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits used essentially the Howey
test, and the Second Circuit used the "family resemblance" test. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 950.
66. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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deciding what effect a state's characterization of a note should have on the
federal definition of a security. 67
The problems of this indeterminacy become particularly acute with new
investment vehicles because they are specifically designed to be mutations
of traditional vehicles. In an active securities market, sophisticated investors
are constantly seeking new investment vehicles" that either offer (1) new
qualities, 69 (2) "pure" qualities, 70 (3) or new combinations of qualities.7'
67. Reves, 110 S. Ct. at 954; id. at 958 note * (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); cf. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1967) (holding that state
law creating instrument defines its characteristics but that federal law must govern whether
the instrument is security).
68. Investors can sometimes replicate the vehicles they want through trading strategies,
regardless of whether the vehicle they want actually exists. See infra note 97. Advances in
technology have also played a part in the development of new vehicles. Stem & Zweig, supra
note 11, at 62.
69. For example, investors' desire to invest in residential real estate mortgages led to the
development of mortgage backed debt instruments. See MICHAEL LEwis, LLR'S POKER: RmssmG
TmOUGH THE WECICAGE ON WALL STREaT, 83-102 (1989). Collateralized mortgage obligations,
a type of mortgage backed instrument, have further refinements such as tranches. See Barbara
Donnelly, How Dangerous Are CMO's for Investors?, WAn. ST. J., Mar. 28, 1990, at Cl.
On the risks of CMO's, see Barbara Donnelly, Small Investors' Hunger for CMO's Scares
Pros, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1991, at CI [hereinafter Donnelly, Small Investors']; Barbara
Donnelly, CMO's May Promise Big Fat Yields, But Investors Should Know the Risks, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 12, 1991, at CI [hereinafter Donnelly, CMO's May Promise]; Barbara Donnelly,
How to Make 'Scenario Analysis' Work for You, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1991, at C1 [hereinafter
Donnelly, 'Scenario Analysis]; Susan Pulliam, Insurance Regulators Express Concern Over
Safety of Certain Types of CMO's, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1992, at A5. These vehicles offered
investment qualities that had not been available before. Other recent vehicles offering new
qualities are: an instrument that permits investors to transfer allowances to emit sulfur dioxide
that were created by the Clean Air Act of 1990. See Peter Passell, A New Commodity to Be
Traded: Government Permits for Pollution, N.Y. Tam, July 17, 1991, at Al. Another vehicle
is a three year warrant offered by the American Stock Exchange that varies in price according
to the Major Market Index of stocks. See George Anders, Amex is Hoping to List U.S. Stock-
Index Warrants, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1990, at C21. Finally, one new instrument is a bond
secured by credit card receivables. See Constance Mitchell, Credit-Card Bonds Are Hot, but
May Be Stingy on Yield, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1990, at CI; cf. Lynn K. Adler & Anita
Raghavan, Giant Credit-Card Securities Market Witnesses First Early Pay-Out on Southeast
Bank's Issue, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1991, at C19 (describing early maturation of credit-card
bond when consumer defaults on receivables backing bond reached predetermined level).
70. For example, investors' desire to invest in one but not both of an equity's appreciation
methods (i.e. either principal appreciation or dividend declaration) led to the development of
trusts offering essentially those qualities (Americus Trusts) and to the unsuccessful Unbundled
Stock Units. See Sixth Annual Review of Developments in Business Financing, 45 Bus. LAw.
441, 446 (1989) [hereinafter Sixth Annual Review] (describing Unbundled Stock Units); Floyd
Norris, Americus Trust Becoming Extinct, N.Y. Tiars, Feb. 13, 1992, at D12 (discussing
demise of Americus Trust because of adverse tax consequences for trusts formed after 1987);
Karen Slater, Investors May be Ready for 'Prime' Time, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1990, at C1
(discussing Americus Trusts). Those instruments allowed investors to focus on precisely the
investment qualities they chose without being forced to invest in instruments with unwanted
qualities.
71. For example, General Motors has offered two series of preference shares, called
Preference Equity Redemption Cumulative Stock (PERCS), that offer an enhanced dividend
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This constant expansion of vehicles is called "spanning. ' 7 2 Describing some
of these new products reveals the potential coverage problems. 73 For ex-
ample, the American Stock Exchange warrants, which offer new qualities,
could be considered investment contracts or warrants or both. Americus
Trusts, which pull pure qualities out of traditional stock, could be analyzed
under the Forman test or under the Howey test or some new test. Similarly,
in return for a call provision if the underlying General Motors' stock increases significantly.
See Roger Lowenstein & Joseph B. White, GM's New Security Is Seen Luring Buyers, WALL
ST. J., June 25, 1991, at CI (discussing PERCS on GM common stock); Craig Torres, Veteran
Stock Traders Say Percs Securities Should Be Valued Properly Before Purchase, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 8, 1991, at C2 [hereinafter Torres, Veteran Stock Traders] (describing importance and
difficulty of valuing PERCS); Craig Torres, GM's Perc Securities May Be Flashing Signal
That Company's Dividend Will Be Slashed, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1991, at C2 [hereinafter
Torres, GM's Perc Securities] (noting potential use of PERCS as price discovery mechanism
for GM common stock); Craig Torres, GM, on the Back of EDS Unit, Raises Funds By
Doubling Offering That Has 6.5% Yield, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1992, at C2 [hereinafter
Torres, GM, on the Back of EDS Unit] (describing PERCS to be issued covering GM Class
E stock which gives holders right to participate in earnings from GM's EDS unit). RJR
Nabisco, Texas Instruments, and Kmart have also issued PERCS. Torres, Veteran Stock
Traders, supra, at C2. But see Larry Light, 'Percs' You May Be Better Off Without, Bus.
WK., Apr. 20, 1992, at 107 (noting decline of PERCS because of concerns of corporations
over potential dilution except during periods of rising markets).
Another new vehicle, the contingent value right, will pay the holder if the price of a
company's common stock fails to reach a predetermined level. See Stanley W. Angrist, Obscure
CVRs Offer Low-Risk Profits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1991, at Cl; Graham Button, A Kick
in the Pants for Investors, FoRBEs, Nov. 11, 1991, at 89 (commenting on potential adverse
tax consequences to investors of contingent value rights).
Merrill Lynch offered a zero coupon convertible bond called a Liquid Yield Option Note
(LYON). See Jon Friedman & Larry Light, It's A Bond, It's A Stock, It's... A LYON?,
Bus. WK., August 6, 1990, at 66. On the checkered career of LYON's, see John R. Dorfman
& William Power, Merrill Calls One of Its LYONs, Causes Uproar As Investors Protest
Involuntary Cashing Out, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1991, at C2; Merrill Lynch to Buy Back Liquid
Yield Option Notes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1991, at C19; Randall Smith, Tax Status of LYONs,
One of Street's Hottest Products, Gets IRS Challenge, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1991, at Cl;
Randall Smith, IRS Is Abandoning Challenge to Status Of Popular LYONs, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 22, 1992, at C21.
Finally, the Chicago Board of Trade announced that it would introduce a futures contract
that would allow insurance companies to reduce the risk of reinsurance. See Eric N. Berg,
New Futures Contract On Insurance Planned, N.Y. Twss, May 17, 1990, at D6.
72. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990). In an example of how spanning feeds on itself, one recent development
involves creating a new vehicle that offers "pure" qualities formerly found in a new vehicle
that offered new combinations of qualities! Salomon Brothers and First Boston Corporation
developed a Super-LYON based on the new LYONs described in supra note 71. Super-LYONs
separate the zero coupon aspect of LYONs from their convertibility rights and allow the
purchaser to sell either aspect separately. See Laura Jereski, Super-LYONs, FoRBES, June 8,
1992, at 44. For examples of strategies using spanning, see Stanley W: Angrist, How to Make
Much of Midsized Stocks-Options, Futures Hedge S&P Index, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1992,
at Cl; Jonathan Clements, Here Are Four Strategies for Building The Right Mutual Fund
Portfolio for You, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1992, at Cl.
73. See, e.g., Stern & Zweig, supra note 11, at 62 (listing seven different kinds of
securitized loans); Taylor, supra note 10, at CI (listing 12 new vehicles introduced in 1991).
REINVENTING A SECURITY
contingent value rights combine elements of equity interest, like stock, with
an element of futurity, like a futures contract. Reinsurance futures could
be exempted from coverage as contracts of insurance or could be stock or
futures. Finally, sulfur dioxide allowances might be stock or futures or
might be exempted from securities coverage because they are regulated by
the Environmental Protection Agency.
The impossibility of predicting accurately which, if any, of those in-
struments would be held to be a security has inhibited the development and
marketing of new vehicles because the criteria for coverage are unrelated
to the needs of all market participants and of the markets in the aggregate. 74
Coverage depends instead upon the potential purchasers' needs.
7
1
The current analysis forces developers of new instruments either to
tailor the vehicles around the contours of the analysis76 or to market new
instruments abroad.77 Taking the first alternative can dilute a new vehicle's
effectiveness because it requires including or withholding qualities that the
developer believes would be optimal.78 The contrast between IP's and market
74. See Anita Raghavan, Wall Street Moves In on Futures Products, WALL ST. J., Feb.
4, 1992, at Cl (citing frustration and competitive disadvantage of exchanges over other
marketers because of delays in regulatory approval); Kevin G. Salwen, SEC May Clear New
Financial Products Soon, WAL. ST. J., Jan. 10, 1992, at A5A (stating that "[m]any exchange
executives have complained privately about an apparent slowdown in SEC approvals of new
products"); Robert Steiner, Amex Sets Trading in Options Index on Drug Stocks, WAII ST.
J., June 18, 1992, at AI0 (describing frustration of American Stock Exchange officials that
SEC approval of option index based on pharmaceutical companies was so delayed that vehicle
seems likely to be unprofitable because investor interest in such companies has declined); Craig
Torres, Bull Market For Derivatives Outruns Rules, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1991, at Cl; see
also Kurt Eichenwald, Little Interest In Stock Baskets, N.Y. Tnmrs, Mar. 12, 1990, at D4;
David Greising, How Turf Wars Killed a Good Investment Product, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989,
at 94; William Power, Stock-Basket Product Being Suspended By Big Board Due to Lack of
Interest, WAL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1991, at C19; William Power & Craig Torres, Two Exchanges
Cease Trading in "Basket" Items, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1989, at CI; Thomas E. Ricks,
'Stock Basket' Approval Stirs Court Action, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1989, at Cl; Thomas E.
Ricks, 'Stock Basket' Plan May Get Support, But Faces Hurdles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1989,
at C19.
75. Sawen, supra note 74, at A5A (quoting SEC Commissioner Mary Shapiro as saying
that "[t]here are a lot of questions raised about how to [oversee] each market, about jurisdiction
and about customer protection").
76. The American Stock Exchange SPDR's were designed to solve the regulatory problems
of IP's. Steiner, supra note 2, at CL
77. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Chicago Futures Going Worldwide, N.Y. TMss, June
24, 1992, at D6 (citing practice of foreign competitors marketing new instruments abroad and
taking market share away from domestic exchanges); Salwen, supra note 74, at ASA (SEC
Commissioner Mary "Shapiro said she is eager to approve new products to allow U.S.
exchanges and our firms to be able to compete. 'Some of these products already are trading
in Europe, and with the proper surveillance in place, they ought to be able to trade in the
U.S.', she said").
78. See Torres, supra note 74, at Cl, C9 (quoting influential securities lawyer as saying
that "products are being tinkered with to be pigeon-holed in the law. The public isn't getting
more protection, and the product isn't getting sounder"). The vice chairman of a major
Chicago bank stated that "[tihe biggest problem is when you try to invent something new and
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baskets throws the problems of following this course into relief. Market
baskets were developed to avoid any question that the securities laws might
not apply to them; they have been unsuccessful in part because of the
inclusion of qualities that made them clearly subject to the securities laws.' 9
Whether SPDR's will suffer the same fate remains to be seen. The second
avenue, foreign marketing, has already been used and may be used more
frequently, with potentially devastating consequences for the American
capital markets. 0
This stifling of new products at home and their increased marketing
abroad works to the detriment of the American economy, its capital
markets, 81 and the investors, issuers, intermediaries, and regulators, that
participate in those markets. Home mortgages are one example of how new
investment vehicles affect the real economy. In 1974 home buyers had
difficulty obtaining mortgages because banks found more profitable uses
for loan money. In 1991, when a recession and falling home prices should
likewise have made banks reluctant to lend to home buyers, mortgages were
plentiful. The difference was, at least in part, caused by the development
in the interim of mortgage-backed securities. By 1991 banks could package
their home mortgages into pools and sell securities based on those pools.
That ability to package loans, and thus reduce risk, made banks more
willing to lend.
82
Inhibiting new investment vehicles reduces the American trading mar-
kets' liquidity because investors are less eager to trade when spanning
possibilities are reduced. Since Red October, 83 spanning has increased in
fit it into the jigsaw of current [U.S.] regulation. One guy will argue that it fits one place;
one argues it fits another. Both fear that if tested in court, they will be wrong. The uncertainty
is a big problem." Id. at C9.
79. Power, supra note 74, at C19; cf. Steiner, supra note 2, at Cl.
80. See Eichenwald, supra note 77, at D6 (noting that because of foreign marketing
efforts, Chicago's share of worldwide futures market has fallen to 50% from earlier level of
almost 100%); Diana B. Henriques, In World Markets, Loose Regulation, N.Y. Tms, July
23, 1991, at DI (asserting that "[tihe pace of this trend is startling: The net purchases of
foreign stocks and bonds by American investors tripled from 1988 to 1990, and market
researchers expect those sharp gains to continue"); Salwen, supra note 74, at AJA (quoting
SEC Commissioner Mary Shapiro as saying that many new products under SEC review are
already trading abroad); Torres, supra note 74, at C9 (noting that "[s]ome derivative traders
say they are increasingly frustrated by uneven U.S. regulations and may decide to move their
business abroad. 'I would be willing to bet that in two years most of our competitors in equity
derivatives will move to London' because of tight U.S. regulations" quoting a banker with a
large French bank); Craig Torres, Liquidity Drought Worsens the Plight Of Profit-Thirsty
Stock Market Players, WAL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1990, At C1 [hereinafter Torres, Liquidity
Drought].
81. Both the trading market and the capital formation market.
82. Stern & Zweig, supra note 11, at 62; see also Suzanne Woolley & Stan Crock, 'You
Can Securitize Virtually Everything,' Bus. WK., July 20, 1992, at 78 (suggesting that purpose
of proposed SEC rules to ease securitization of small business loans is to facilitate making of
such loans).
83. The October 1987 crash produced such large losses-red ink-that it is sometimes
called Red October.
REINVENTING A SECURITY
response to the realization that the various trading markets for equities and
derivatives 4 are effectively one market. Dramatic proof of this link came
in April 1992 when the flood that halted trading in the Chicago futures
and options markets resulted in reduced volume and price movement in the
stock markets. On the New York Stock Exchange, the day's volume was
the second lowest of the year and, after the Chicago markets closed, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average traded within a narrow five point range."5
This changed perception of those markets led to the development of
new vehicles that take advantage of that unity through making the market
more efficient. This efficiency comes about when the new products either
reduce costs or act as price discovery mechanisms.16 The markets then
become more attractive to traders who, in turn, increase the markets'
liquidity. This added liquidity is the single attribute that most determines
the health of the trading markets, and one that has been declining since
the October 1987 crash.Y Such new instruments as SPDRs, IPs, market
baskets, Americus Trusts, reinsurance futures, credit-card backed debt in-
struments, and others have been developed and introduced since the crash.
88
These products' success will maximize the liquidity of the American markets,
easing the largest problem facing those markets. 9 It seems likely that the
need for such new instruments will continue.
84. A derivative is an instrument whose price is a function of the price of another
instrument. ALLAN H. PassN & JOSEPH A. Ross, STILL MORE WORDS OF WALL STREET 70
(1990). The derivative market has recently been estimated at over $I0,000,000,000,000. Steven
Lipin & William Power, 'Derivatives' Draw Warnings From Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar.
25, 1992, at Cl.
85. Randall Smith et al., Flood in Chicago Waters Down Trading on Wall Street, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 14, 1992, at Cl; see, e.g., Angrist, supra note 72, at CI (describing investment
strategies that use equities and derivatives).
86. Transaction costs may be lower for one product rather than another as with stock
index futures and stocks. Purchasing an index future is a single transaction and is significantly
cheaper than buying up to 500 stocks which may make up the index. U.S. GAO, Financial
Markets: Preliminary Observations on the October 1987 Crash, at 30 n.6 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter
Financial Markets]; see also James Sterngold, Steps to Aid Big Trades Weighed, N.Y. Tnmss,
June 10, 1988, at Dl.
Lower transaction costs, in turn, is one reason why investors may prefer to trade one
vehicle rather than the other; the first vehicle will set the price for the second. For example,
partly because the futures markets have lower transactions costs (and partly because the vehicle
traded embodies the investors' views of near term future prices in stocks) stock index futures
are the price discovery mechanism for the stock market. Financial Markets, supra, at 30 n.6.
87. Eric A. Chiappinelli, Red October: Its Origins, Consequences, and the Need to
Revive the National Market System, 18 SEc. REG. L.J. 144, 146 n.5 (1990). Increasing liquidity
makes the trading markets more efficient and less volatile and lowers transactions costs for
all participants. Id. For a discussion of the interrelationship between efficiency and liquidity,
see id. at 155.
88. See, e.g., Sixth Annual Review, supra note 70, at 444-49; Seventh Annual Review
of Developments in Business Financing, 46 Bus. LAW. 693, 693-702 (1991) [hereinafter Seventh
Annual Review]; cf. Power, supra note 74, at C19 (reporting suspension of market baskets).
89. See, e.g., Torres, Liquidity Drought, supra note 80, at Cl; Market Regulation
Director Remarks on Future Structural Issues, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), No. 1334, at 9 (1989)
[hereinafter Market Regulation Director Remarks]; Chiappinelli, supra note 87, at 155-57.
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A related lesson of Red October is that the world's trading markets are
also strongly linked.9 Investors and others have increased their global
participation since 1987. The global investment markets have assumed
increased importance as well because the capital committed to the American
markets has shrunk as a result of the 1987 crash. A part of that capital
has simply moved to markets outside the United States.
A major goal for United States regulators and for market participants
is to attract capital from abroad and to retain American capital in American
trading markets.9' New products such as Nikkei warrants, TOPIX futures
and options, 92 deposit notes,9 and FT-SE warrants9 are designed to appeal
to this global market, either by allowing Americans to invest domestically
in vehicles that have returns based on foreign events, or by drawing foreign
capital to America.9 5
Not only do American trading markets benefit from spanning, but the
capital formation market does as well. New investment methods increase
the options of corporations seeking capital. Those options increase the
number of issuers that can make use of the capital markets. These new
90. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS Study I
(1988) [hereinafter BRADY REPORT].
91. See SEC Approves NYSE, CBOE Proposals to Trade New Stock Basket Products,
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1593 (1989) (SEC Chairman Breeden commenting that new
trading system would help United States recapture some of business that moved overseas);
Tony McAuley, Europe's Futures Markets Hotly Pursue U.S. Leaders, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27,
1991, at Cl (detailing battle between American and foreign exchanges over derivatives).
American exchanges controlled virtually all exchange traded derivatives ten years ago. "Europe's
share of the world derivatives market will end the year [1991] at about 20%, up from 17.4%
in 1990 and cutting further into the U.S. exchanges' share, which fell to 60% in the first nine
months of this year [1991] from 67% in the year-earlier period." Id.; William Power & Kevin
G. Sawen, Big Board's Donaldson Says SEC Rules Could Cost Exchange Its Global Standing,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1991, at Cl (noting that SEC and NYSE chairman were both in favor
of increased trading in America of foreign stocks); SEC Criticizes CFTC Draft Proposal to
Extend Regulation to Hybrid Products, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1348 (1988) (warning
that CFTC draft proposal of restrictions on "hybrid-product trading" would "frustrate
'legitimate capital-raising efforts' and could drive hybrid-product financings by U.S. corpo-
rations overseas"); William Power, Floor Fight: Brokers Gird for War Over Plan for S & P
"Basket," WALL ST. J., July 24, 1989, at Cl; William Power, Big Board to Launch 'Basket'
Trades Today, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1989, at Cl; Salwen, supra note 74, at ASA (attributing
spurt of new products seeking regulatory approval often involving foreign stocks or indexes
to brokers trying to satisfy needs of clients with multinational portfolios); Craig Torres
Securities Firms Aren't Jumping to Trade New 500-Stock Baskets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1989,
at Cl.
92. CBOT to Introduce Futures Tied to Japanese Markets, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1990,
at C12.
93. Sixth Annual Review, supra note 70, at 446.
94. George Anders, Are All Wall Street's New Warrants Really Warranted?, WAIL ST.
J., May 3, 1990, at Cl.
95. See Craig Torres, Amex Gives a Boost to Foreign Indexes-Aim Is to Promote
Related Warrants, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1991, at Cl; Hilary Stout & Paul Duke Jr., IRS
Reluctant to Give Its Nod For New Bond, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1990, at Cl (noting concerns
for foreign competition).
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products, to be successful, must also satisfy investor needs. If they do so,
more investors will be willing to commit greater capital to the capital
formation market, which in turn will increase the total liquidity of the
market and increase the number of issuers that may resort to that market.
This increased liquidity and increased options for financing serves to lower
the total cost of capital, which helps the real economy by encouraging
capital formation. Thus, this increased capital formation and decreased costs
are directly related to total economic productivity and gross national prod-
uct.
96
The trading and capital formation markets are not the only beneficiaries
of spanning. New investment vehicles help investors, issuers, intermediaries,
and regulators, and each of those groups has supported new instruments.
Investors use new vehicles to develop trading strategies that have the
potential for additional profits.Y Also, new vehicles may allow investors to
assume or shed risk.98 Finally, investors may use new vehicles as price
96. See, e.g., Torres, GM, on the Back of EDS Unit, supra note 71, at C2 (reporting
that GM doubled size, to $1,500,000,000, of PERC offering based on its Class E common
stock). The Class E stock itself entitles the holder only to the dividend stream from GM's
EDS unit. Id. GM has raised $3,300,000,000 from such new vehicles. "Not one penny of the
capital raised in the [EDS PERC] offering will go directly to EDS to help the company grow.
All of the funds go to hard-pressed parent General Motors, which is trying to shore up its
balance sheet. 'This latest preference share is just further evidence of the struggle GM is going
through now, and their need for cash and capital,' says Terence Quinn, senior technology
analyst at Kidder Peabody.") Id.; Friedman & Light, supra note 71, at 66 (noting that
corporations issuing Liquid Yield Option Notes can raise money from the public at below
market rates and also defer the interest payments for years); Berg, supra note 71, at D6;
Mitchell, supra note 69, at Cl; BRADY REP ORT, supra note 90, at Study VII and Study VIII.
97. Sophisticated investors now resort to a kind of self-help called analytics. Analytics
are complex computed developed trading strategies whose function is to replicate an investment
vehicle. Craig Torres, Mathematicians Race to Develop New Kinds of Trading Instruments,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1991, at Cl. Similarly, in the early 1980s savings and loan associations
used the new mortgage backed securities (and often more esoteric variations such as interest
only or principal only rights called 10 and PO strips) in conjunction with other instruments
to profit from a trading strategy called risk-controlled arbitrage. See LEwis, supra note 69, at
83-102; Donnelly, 'Scenario Analysis,' supra note 69, at Cl; Charles McCoy, Many Big S&L
Losses Turn Out to Be Due To a Financial Gamble, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1991, at Al; see
also Angrist, supra note 72, at Cl; Clements, supra note 72, at Cl.
98. Sometimes they do both at the same time. For example, banks pool their loans and
sell securities in the pools to reduce their risk. They then buy securities based on the loan
pools securitized by other banks. It was reported that in the first six months of 1991 banks
bought back over 25% of the loans they securitized. Stem & Zweig, supra note 11, at 62; see
also Angrist, supra note 71, at Cl (rights allow investors to reduce the risk of common stock);
Chiappinelli, supra note 87, at 158 n.48 and sources cited; Donnelly, CMO's May Promise,
supra note 69, at Cl; Donnelly, 'Scenario Analysis', supra note 69, at Cl; Donnelly, Small
Investors', supra note 69, at Cl; Slater, supra note 70, at Cl (noting that new instruments
allow investors to accept more or less of risk of common stocks); Leah N. Spiro, Money
Machine, Bus. Wic., June 10, 1991, at 80, 83-84; Jeffrey Taylor, CBOT Puts Insurance Futures
on Hold, WAni ST. J., Sept. 4, 1991, at Cl; Woolley & Crock, supra note 82, at 78 (attributing
investors' preference for asset-backed securities to risk reduction and increased liquidity).
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discovery surrogates for other vehicles."
Issuers may want to create new investment products to transfer risk or
raise capital.'00 Mortgage backed securities were developed not only to satisfy
investors, but to permit savings and loans to lay off part of the risk of
their loan portfolios and to raise money to loan out.10 1 A corporation
needing externally generated capital must consider many factors in selecting
the appropriate vehicle for raising that capital. The first factor is the total
amount of capital needed. Second is the time for which that capital will be
required: short term, medium term, and permanent or very long term needs.
If the need is short term, a corporation's choice of vehicle may depend in
part upon whether that need is predictable and cyclical or unpredictable
and extraordinary. Corporations, of course, seek to raise capital as cheaply
as possible. The cost must be measured not only by the interest or dividend
that will be paid but by the other attributes of the vehicle that may make
it more or less desirable to purchasers. That desire may directly affect the
interest rate or dividend but even without such an affect, those attributes
are a "cost" that must be borne. These attributes include such things as
the source, priority, surety, and frequency of repayment, and the rights of
holders to participate in management. Corporations must also consider the
needs of potential purchasers, which may include new, pure, or hybrid
qualities as discussed above. '? Certainly of prime importance to a potential
investor is the ease or difficulty with which the vehicle can sold; the existence
of a secondary trading market. 03
Financial intermediaries such as exchanges and broker-dealers may also
seek to develop new products for proprietary reasons. A new product may
cost a million dollars to develop and market,104 but the brokerage commis-
sions and other fees'05 can return enormous profits.10e The competition to
99. See Chiappinelli, supra note 87, at 158 n.48 and sources cited; Torres, GM's Perc
Securities, supra note 71, at C2 (describing GM PERC as price surrogate for GM common
stock).
100. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 71, at D6; Friedman & Light, supra note 71, at 66; Stem
& Zweig, supra note 11, at 62; Torres, GM, on the Back of EDS Unit, supra note 71, at C2.
101. See Lawis, supra note 69, at 83-102; Stem & Zweig, supra note 11, at 62; Woolley
& Crock, supra note 82, at 78.
102. The needs may include the tax consequences of the investment, as well. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. BaRALY & STEWART C. MYERs, PRINCIPLEs OF Co oRATE FMNANCE 322-23 (4th
ed. 1991); Button, supra note 71, at 89.
103. See generally BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 102, ch. 14; Wn.uAM A. K1nml & Jomi
C. Co=, JR., BusINEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANcE: LEGAL AiN EcONOMIc Pan wcnips 278-
379 (4th ed. 1990); Woolley & Crock, supra note 82, at 78.
104. Taylor, supra note 98, at CI.
105. See James A. White, Just What the Street Needs-A New Index, WAL. ST. J., Mar.
26, 1992, at Cl.
106. See, e.g., Anders, supra note 94, at Cl (noting that because most new products cost
$1 million or less, I in 10 success ratio can be profitable); Stanley W. Angrist, In Search of
the 'Hot' Futures Contract, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1991, at Cl; Friedman & Light, supra note
71, at 66 (observing that for brokerage houses, LYONs mean large fees); Woolley & Crock,
supra note 82, at 78; see also Berg, supra note 71, at D6 (citing competition, spokesman for
Chicago Board of Trade declined to give details of new product).
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develop successful new investment vehicles is so intense,' °7 and the cost so
expensive, that the developers go to great lengths to protect whatever
proprietary rights they may have. °0 For example, the ill-fated unbundled
stock units were developed by a brokerage house. IP's and SPDR's were
developed by the exchanges and were opposed by the futures exchanges
largely because of a perception that they would capture some of the demand
for stock index futures.'19 Those intermediaries are also among the largest
investors; they desire new products for the same reasons as other investors." 0
Finally, at least some new products are developed at the instigation of
regulators to protect the domestic markets from inefficiency and from
foreign competition."' In the aftermath of the October 1987 market crash,
regulators worked to develop market baskets. ' 2 Regulatory requirements
may also give an incentive to issuers to use new vehicles. For example,
banks issue securities based on pools of their loans in part to assuage
regulatory concerns. " 3
III. A PuBLIc INTEREST DEFINrMoN
The current calculus for determining the scope of the securities laws is
not bad, as far as it goes. It is in fact quite, useful in protecting people
who invest their money. The current tests, however, fail to consider either
the public needs of the American capital markets or to recognize that those
markets are being hurt by that failure. What is needed is an expanded
calculus that explicitly includes consideration of the capital formation and
107. See Raghavan, supra note 74, at Cl.
108. Anders, supra note 94, at Cl; Eichenwald, supra note 77, at D6 (noting that, because
instruments are not patentable, Chicago exchanges began Globex as way to protect market
share against foreign appropriation of instruments); William Power & Milo Geyelin, Ideas for
New Financial Products Must Be Novel to Gain Protection, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1991, at B8;
Torres, supra note 94, at Cl; see also Berg, supra note 71, at D6 (citing competition,
spokesman for the Chicago Board of trade declined to give details of new product); cf. Index
Participation Rule Change, supra note 5, at 15,284 (addressing proprietary concerns between
competing exchanges).
109. The proprietary concerns of the Philadelphia Exchange (Phlx) in the development of
their IP (designated CIP) were so strong that they contended their development secured a
vested property right protected by copyright. Index Participation Rule Change, supra note 5,
at 15,284. The American Stock Exchange product, the PhIx contended, infringed on that right.
Id. For other examples of the competitive concerns of the exchanges, see Berg, supra note 71,
at D6 (noting that CBOT spokesman declined to give details about reinsurance futures citing
competition with other exchanges); Power & Geyelin, supra note 108, at B3.
110. E.g., Spiro, supra note 98, at 80; Torres, supra note 97, at Cl.
111. See, e.g., Sterngold, supra note 86, at D1 (noting that David Ruder, then SEC
Chairman, had "encouraged the stock exchange to create a cash index vehicle to be traded
on the floor a way of making the market more efficient"); Woolley & Crock, supra note 82,
at 78 (noting that SEC has proposed rules making it easier to securitize small business-backed
loans to ease small business credit crunch).
112. The coup de grace for market baskets came in late 1991. Power, supra note 74, at
C19.
113. Stern & Zweig, supra note 11, at 62.
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secondary trading markets (both in isolation and vis-&-vis foreign markets),
and issues of market regulation." 4
The prior discussion suggests that an instrument ought to be within the
definition of a security if it aids capital formation by increasing liquidity
or lowering costs," 5 or improves the trading markets by adding liquidity,
aiding price discovery, or reducing transaction costs." 6 However, another
set of public concerns has yet to be considered. More rational or more
effective market regulation has a beneficial effect on the trading markets."
7
A new instrument should be subject to the securities laws when doing so
would achieve such regulatory benefits as uniformity" 8 or market consoli-
dation, market integrity, or market participant oversight.' 9
114. The literature on the definition of a security is quite large; literature on narrower
aspects of that question is enormous. Useful sources for the most valuable articles are HAZEN,
supra note 23, at 24 n.19; 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 920 n.120.
At least one scholar has proposed a test that takes account in some way of the national
securities markets. Professor FitzGibbon, writing on the cusp of the explosion of new
instruments that began in the early 1980's, recognized that Congress was concerned with the
financial markets when it adopted the Securities Acts. FitzGibbon, supra note 23, at 912-16.
He also recognized the possibility that many new instruments would be introduced. Id. at 933.
His proposal, though, would limit the definition of security essentially to instruments
that effect the production of goods and services. That definition would exclude some (perhaps
all) derivative instruments and certainly would exclude instruments based, for example, on
indexes of stocks. Id. at 919-21. Professor FitzGibbon would also require that the purchaser
intend that gain come primarily from the production of those goods and services, again
eliminating some instruments that, under my analysis might be securities. Id. at 921-25. Perhaps
most centrally, Professor FitzGibbon's analysis is incomplete because it is rooted not only in
notions of Congressional intent (rather than concern with the national economy as a matter
of current public policy apart from Congress's purpose in the 1930s) but in the goal of investor
protection. Id. at 926-28 (observing that definition of security tied to that of open market,
which turns basically on participation of individual investors needing protection).
115. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 81-95. As noted above, an instrument adds to
liquidity when it keeps capital in the United States or draws foreign capital to domestic
markets. See, e.g., Richard E. Rustin, 'Early Bird' NASDAQ Plan Hits a Snag, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 23, 1990, at Cl; Stout & Duke, supra note 95, at Cl (noting that new rule 144A aimed
at increasing liquidity in U.S. capital markets and opening those markets to foreign companies);
Craig Torres, Big Board Facing Serious Erosion as Market for Stocks, Chief Warns, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 13, 1991, at Cl (warning by NYSE Chairman Donaldson about effects of foreign
products on future success of exchange).
117. Cf. David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the Trading
of Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REy. 967, 1022-25 (1991).
118. Uniformity of regulation may be defeated in two ways. Two or more instruments
may be related but are not covered under the same regulatory scheme; they may be covered
under different schemes or one may be unregulated entirely. Second, a single instrument may
be subject to coverage under two regulatory schemes, as the IP was.
119. "Market participants" includes registered broker-dealers and futures commission
merchants (FCMs) whether acting for their own accounts or as agents. The term also includes
professional traders such as risk arbitrageurs and institutional investors who may or may not
be registered broker-dealers or FCMs.
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Two dangers arise when two or more instruments are functionally related
but not subject to the same regulatory scheme. One problem is that some
instruments may trade while others do not. The relation between the
instruments then becomes dysfunctional. For example, stock index futures
are regulated by the CFTC and trade in great numbers. Market baskets,
which were designed to compliment stock index futures by allowing investors
to purchase up to five hundred stocks in a single transaction, were regulated
by the SEC, virtually never traded, and were finally suspended in late
1991.120
The second problem is that the ancillary rules governing the instruments
will be different which may also impede the relation between the instruments.
For example, stock index options, which are securities, are in many ways
functional equivalents to stock index futures, which are not securities.
Traders in stock index options are required to comply with the margin
requirements established for securities trading, and such requirements are
far more onerous than the margin requirements for stock index futures
traders.12' Among the reforms to come out of the October 1987 market
crash was the move to unify the trading markets and to centralize their
regulation.'2 A new instrument's similarity to other instruments should
affect the question of coverage for regulatory reasons as well as economic
ones.
When an instrument may be covered under both the securities laws and
another regulatory scheme there is the danger that both regulators will
assert authoity over the instrument or that the other scheme will not be as
beneficial as the securities laws. Litigation, as with the IP, will be necessary
to allocate each new instrument between the competing regulators;' 23 this is
120. Eichenwald, supra note 74, at C4; Power, supra note 74, at C21.
121. Kevin G. Salwen, Greenspan, in Switch Decides to Back Higher Margins on Stock-
Index Futures, W~a ST. J., Mar. 30, 1990, at C9; Kevin G. Salwen, Wall Street Urges SEC
Supervision of Index Futures, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1990, at C13; Kevin G. Salwen & Scott
McMurray, Futures Shock: Tight Rein if SEC Reigns, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1990, at Cl.
122. Dean Foust, The SEC's Dick Breeden: A Superpol Building a Superpower, Bus.
WK., Apr. 2, 1990, at 43; Scott McMurray, Merc May Cede Some Oversight on Indexes to
SEC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1990, at Cl; Kevin G. Salwen, SEC May Receive Boost in Meeting
on Index Futures, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1990, at C18; Kevin G. Saiwen, Plan to Shift
Oversight of Index Futures to SEC is Unveiled by Administration, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1990,
at C23; Kevin G. Salwen, SEC's Schapiro Urges a Merger of Agency, CFTC, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 21, 1990, at Cl. Effecting this change has been seen as making a public policy choice
between expanding the powers of one of the current regulators or creating a new agency. The
likelihood of regulatory unification has varied from time to time since the crash. Salwen,
supra note 9, at C6. Regardless of the outcome of the unification dispute, the need for an
expanded test for securities laws coverage will remain. Even if a single regulatory agency
governs all the markets, courts must still determine whether new products are covered by the
securities laws.
123. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 74, at C9 ("Adds S. Waite Rawls III, vice chairman
at Continental Bank in Chicago: 'The biggest problem is when you try to invent something
new and fit it into the jigsaw of current [U.S.] regulation. One guy will argue that it fits one
place; one argues it fits another. Both fear that if tested in court, they will be wrong. The
uncertainty is a big problem").
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a relatively short term exercise, but not one without significant expense and
uncertainty.
There may be instances, however, where the benefits of the other
regulatory scheme outweigh the cost of exclusion from the securities laws.
The facts of Weaver and Daniel, though not the opinions, are potential
examples. In each case, the reduction in the instrument's risk could have
been found to outweigh the dysfunction from excluding the instruments
from coverage. 24 The calculus for securities coverage should include both
these public interests in assessing whether an instrument should be governed
by the securities laws or by another system.' 21
Increasing market integrity is a second public regulatory concern. One
danger in not extending securities coverage is that the antimanipulation rules
will not apply. For example, a leading broker-dealer manipulated a portion
of the $2.2 trillion market in government securities by cornering several
auctions, including purchasing ninety-four percent of a $12.26 billion of-
fering of two year Treasury notes. 126 The manipulation, which ironically
would have served to reduce in the short term the cost to the government,
2 7
prompted calls for regulation of the essentially unregulated secondary gov-
ernment trading market.1
2
124. The opinions did focus on the reduction in risk, but used that reduction only to
consider whether the holders needed the securities laws' protection. The opinions did not
consider risk reduction vis-a-vis market impairment.
125. This was suggested by commentators after Red October by comparing the CFTC to
the SEC or the Federal Reserve Board. See, e.g., Chiappinelli, supra note 87, at 172; Scott
McMurray, Stotler Collapse Indicates Futures Funds' Growth Has Outpaced Their Regulation,
Analysts Say, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1990, at C12; cf. Kenneth H. Bacon & Kevin G. Salwen,
Summer of Financial Scandals Raises Questions About the Ability of Regulators to Police
Markets, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1991, at A10 (discussing series of scandals in June, July, and
August 1991 led many to question competence of regulators); Henriques, supra note 80, at
DI (regulation usually lax or nonexistent in many countries); The SEC Chairman Moves
Quickly to Capitalize on the Salomon Scandal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1991, at Al (observing
that SEC Chairman Richard Breeden emphasizes SEC regulatory skills and lack of skills in
Treasury Department and Federal Reserve System).
126. Laurie P. Cohen & Michael Siconolfi, Salomon Reveals It Had Control Of 94% of
Notes at May Auction, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1991, at Cl; Gary Weiss, et al., Clearing The
Wreckage, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1991, at 66 (detailing methods by which Salomon may have
effected and profited from squeeze).
127. Christopher Farrell, Did Salomon's Scheming Raise Interest Rates?, Bus. WK., Sept.
2, 1991, at 69.
128. SEC et al., Joint Report on the Government Securities Market, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,919 (Jan. 22, 1992) [hereinafter Joint Report]; John Connor & Kevin G. Salwen,
Pressure Grows For SEC Role In Agency Debt, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1991, at Cl; Michael
Siconolfi et al., Salomon's Admission Of T-Note Infractions Gives Market a Jolt, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 12, 1991, at Al (noting that "a senior regulator said: 'The longer-run concern is that
people will be less willing to hold Treasury debt, because they believe the market is being
manipulated or rigged by one player. The integrity of the market demands that it be perceived
as a fair, open marketplace.' The Salomon disclosure is likely to influence how Congress
proceeds with the renewal, this fall, of the 1986 Government Securities Act. The bill expected
to be introduced in the House, which SEC Chairman Richard Breeden strongly favors, would
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A third aspect of market regulation is oversight of market participants'
financial integrity. Coverage should depend in part on the financial risk to
which the investors, market participants, and clearing and settling partici-
pants will be exposed. Coverage can monitor such risk and limit participants
from accepting excessive risk. This consideration may be particularly im-
portant when the participants involved in a new instrument are also dealing
with covered instruments, so as to present the risk that a portion of the
participant's capital will be monitored and another portion will not. 2 9
Again a recent example is instructive. Among the new trading vehicles
is an interest rate swap often used by institutions such as banks to hedge
or protect against unanticipated changes in interest rates or currency ex-
change rates. 30 Swaps can be used alone or in conjunction with strategies
such as risk-controlled arbitrage; 3' the total swaps market is estimated at
five trillion dollars. 3 2 Swaps are essentially unregulated and, under current
accounting practices, are not reflected on the balance sheets of banks.
Recently, as the Bank of New England's financial problems worsened
because of a deteriorating real estate loan portfolio, the bank found itself
with another, potentially as serious, problem. The bank, which had thirty
billion dollars worth of assets, also had thirty-six billion dollars worth of
swaps and found that other traders were becoming increasingly reluctant to
trade with it because of its precarious financial position. Fortunately, the
bank was able to stave off disaster from the swaps (though not from the
bad loans; the bank was seized by banking regulators in early 1991) but
regulators were unable to control the size of the bank's swaps exposure and
trading activities. The next swaps debacle may be far worse.
33
give regulators more muscle over the secondary, or resale, market in government securities,
by requiring the SEC to oversee dissemination of price and volume information. 'The
government market has been a largely unregulated gap in the securities markets,' Mr. Breeden
said"; cf. John Connor, Fed Bank Probes Possible "Squeezes" in Treasury Issues, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 23 1992, at CIO (observing another possible manipulation in Treasury securities
market, long after Salomon scandal).
129. See Market Regulation Director Remarks, supra note 89, at 9-10; Kevin G. Salwen
& Sandra Block, SEC to Seek Rules To Raise Scrutiny Of Brokers' Parents, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 30, 1991, at C19; Kevin G. Salwen & Constance Mitchell, SEC Is Weighing Steps to
Control Market in Asset-Backed Securities, WA. ST. J., June 28, 1991, at Cl; Ten Financial
Executives Named by SEC to Panel, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1991, at C8.
130. See William Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever: Big Money, Big Risks, Bus. WK.,
June 1, 1992, at 102 (describing mechanics of swaps).
131. See Risk Isn't Always Controlled, supra note 97, at A4.
132. See Glasgall & Javetski, supra note 130, at A4.
133. See JoHN W. BACHMANN ET AL., REPORT OF THE BACHMANN TASK FORCE ON
CLEARNANCE AND SE rL EINT REFORM IN U.S. SECURTImS MARKETs 11 (1992); Lipin & Power,
supra note 84, at Cl (noting influential regulator is warning market participants about risk to
entire world financial system from large loss by single participant in trading derivatives,
especially swaps); Glasgall & Javetski, supra note 130, at 103; Michael Siconolfi, Merrill Sets
Up Unit to Cash In On Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1991, at C21 (noting that major
brokerage house established separate unit to trade derivatives, especially swaps. The unit will
have higher credit rating than brokerage house itself, which will result in greater trading power
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IV. O=hnR GoAls
So far, the argument for expanding the definition of a security has
rested upon economic or regulatory benefits. These are the more socially
compelling reasons for changing the analysis but they are not the only ones.
The public interest test is entirely consonant with the traditional touchstones
of congressional intention and prior case law. Protecting the public interest
in the national markets would help give effect to Congress's full intention
in enacting the securities acts and several amendments. Further, a public
interest test would be intellectually compatible with the traditional approach
to securities coverage and would provide, in some cases, a greater measure
of predictability.
As a matter of congressional intent, the expanded calculus for securities
coverage would give more complete effect to Congress's goals. The Securities
Act was directed at regulating the process of distributing securities to the
public. The primary concern was with disclosure and the protection of
individual investors was the aim.'
3 4
In 1934, though, Congress turned its attention to the secondary trading
markets, and the New York Stock Exchange in particular.'35 Congress
recognized that a larger public interest, apart from individual investors,
called for passage of the 1934 Act and, more directly, that recognition
informed the definition of "security."'1
36
That notion of a link between the national interest in the securities
markets and the definition of a security was more explicit and direct in
congressional amendments in 1975, 1982, and 1986.'17 The Securities Acts
because swaps market is increasingly credit-sensitive); Michael Siconolfi, Moody's to Brokers:
Proceed Cautiously In Derivatives Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1991, at C13 (noting that
major credit rating service warns brokers that substantial derivatives trading could led to
reduced credit rating because of "market, credit, regulatory, and other risks" involved); Craig
Torres, How Financial Squeeze Was Narrowly Avoided in "Derivatives" Trade, WALL ST. J.,
June 18, 1991, at Al; Sandra Block, SEC Chief Suggests Ending Coverage of Banks' Derivative
Securities by FDIC, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1991, at C2; Torres, supra note 74, at Cl, C9.
134. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 175; MICHAEL E. PARISH, SECuRIIEs
REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 5 (1970); JOEL SELiaMAN, THE TRANSFOORMAON OF VALL
STREET 39-50 (1982).
135. SELiGMAN, supra note 134, Ch. 3.
136. FitzGibbon, supra note 23, at 918.
137. Congress has amended the definition of security or the exemptions from that
definition in the Securities Act and Exchange Act on several occasions over the years. Most
of those amendments were obvious ad hoc changes, with little or no legislative history, often
apparently designed to reflect the interaction of the securities acts with other regulatory
schemes. See, e.g., Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 557 (1935)
(amending Section 3(a)(6) of Securities Act to include "contract" carriers to existing "common
carrier" exemption); Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat.
694 (1958) (amending Section 3 of Securities Act to include new subsection (c) allowing
Commission to add exemptions for small business investment companies covered by Small
Business Investment Act. But, additional exemptions are only available after commission finds,
considering purpose of Small Business Investment Act, enforcement of Securities Act is "not
necessary in the interest and for the protection of investors"); 1970 Amendments to the
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Amendments of 1975138 represent Congress's decision to implement a Na-
tional Market System. Based on an SEC proposal, the National Market
System was intended to improve the quality of the nation's equity markets
essentially by maximizing the markets' liquidity. 13 9 The legislative history of
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 is replete with concerns about the
national interest in the health of the securities markets. From the preamble
of the statute itself,140 through the House and Senate reports, 14 1 to remarks
on the floor, 142 the concern was obviously with protecting the markets from
harm.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1498-99 (1970) (amending
sections 3(a)(2) of Securities Act and 3(a)(12) of Exchange Act to reflect addition of industrial
development bonds to list of exemptions); Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2294-95 (1980) (amending sections 3(a)(2) of Securities Act and
3(a)(12) of Exchange Act to reflect addition of "single trust fund" to "collective trust fund"
exemptions). None of the legislative histories in the Congressional Record or Reports speaks
to any of these amendments. See H.R. REP. No. 2060, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-27 (1958)
(Small Business Inv. Act. of 1958); S. REP. No. 1125, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) and H.R.
REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (1970 Amendments to Securities Act of 1933); S.
REP. No. 958, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980).
Congress also made five similar amendments with somewhat more detailed legislative
history, also making ad hoc changes. See Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 718 (1970) (amending sections 3(a) of Securities Act and 3(a)(12) of
Exchange Act to reflect addition of exemption for industrial development bonds). Legislative
history notes that it was not economical for small communities to go through SEC red tape
for approval when IRS approval was already required. 116 CONG. REc. 10,578 (1970);
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1433 (1970)
(amending sections 3(a) of Securities Act and 3(a)(12) of Exchange Act to redefine exempted
securities to include Savings and Loan Associations' instruments). Legislative history indicates
the amendment was technical and nonsubstantive in nature. See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong.,
Ist Sess. at 26 (1969); Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 56 (1976) (amending section 3(a) of Securities Act to remove exemption
for railroad securities). Legislative history indicates that the change was intended to remove
inconsistencies with the Interstate Commerce Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 725, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 103 (1975)); Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1121
(1982) (amending section 3(a) of Securities Act to place all motor carriers under SEC jurisdiction
in securities area); Securities and Exchange Commission Authorization Act of 1987,, Pub. L.
No. 100-181, 101 Stat. 1249 (1987) (amending section 3(a) of Securities Act to remove limitation
on Savings and Loan exemption. Legislative history noted that reason for limitation was
unclear to begin with).
138. Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 27, 30, 89 Stat. 163, 169-70 (1975).
139. Chiappinelli, supra note 87, at 165.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a)(l) (1988).
141. H.R. REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (finding that competition rather
than regulation should be guiding force in economic areas encouraging adoption of laws
removing barriers to competition. The market should assure "maintenance of fair and orderly
markets"); H.R. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (noting legislation aimed at
correcting "misallocation of capital, widespread inefficiencies, and undesirable and potentially
harmful fragmentation of trading markets"); S. Rat. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
(adding the following language to act amended in conference "to remove impediments to and
perfect mechanisms of a national market system for securities").
142. "The final version of this bill is designed to reduce barriers to securities markets,
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Congress again specifically infused a national interest in the definition
of security in the 1982 Amendments to the Securities Acts. 43 The 1982
Amendments enacted an informal accord between the SEC and the CFTC
over their respective jurisdictions. As with the 1975 Amendments, the
legislative history of the 1982 Amendments contain many expressions of
Congress's intention to protect the national markets and to do so through
the scope of the definition of "security."' 44
Lastly, in 1986 Congress became concerned with a number of inter-
mediary failures in the market for federal government securities and enacted
the Government Securities Act of 1986 to bring at least a portion of that
market under greater regulation. 45 As with the earlier amendments, Congress
was acting to protect the public interest in the integrity of the financial
markets through the governor of the statutory definition of "security."'1
Not only would Congressional intention be aided by the public interest
test, but that test would be entirely consonant with the current analysis
because it would be supplemental. Indeed, the Supreme Court has occa-
sionally made reference to these larger national concerns, but has never
used them as a basis for analysis. 47 For example, the Landreth Court might
have looked to the capital formation function of stock as a basis for its
holding. In Daniel the Court could have compared the regulatory efficacy
of the SEC and the Department of Labor, which oversees ERISA, in
deciding whether the presence of another regulatory scheme should exempt
the interests in Daniel from the securities laws.
permit the dissemination of market information and establish the basis for the development
of a national securities market system." 121 CONG. REc. 10,732 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke).
143. 1982 Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409-10 (1982).
144. H.R. REP. No. 626, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) ("These laws were aimed at protecting
public investors, assuring market integrity and, most important, restoring investor confidence
in order to attract needed funds back into the U. S. capital markets. These goals were, and
remain, of paramount concern to Congress").
145. Joint Report, supra note 128; Government Securities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
571, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (1988)). Before the 1986 Act, the
market in government securities was unregulated because such securities were exempted by the
statutes. Government securities have always been considered "securities" for antifraud pur-
poses. Cf. supra text accompanying note 128.
146. The 1986 Amendments again changed the exemptions under 3(a)(12) to add additional
descriptions to the exemptions for government securities. Citing dealer failure as a concern,
these amendments attempted to regulate those dealing in formerly exempted securities. H.R.
REP. No. 258, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1985).
147. The five cases where the court has used support from the public interest are: SEC
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
387 U.S. 202 (1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); and Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990). Joiner
and Howey were unsuitable for the public interest test because the instruments offered in those
cases were unique to the issuers (though the buyers were not unique); SEC v. Howey, 328
U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); see FitzGibbon,
supra note 23, at 912-16 (recognizing that congress was concerned with financial markets when
it adopted Securities Acts).
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V. AN OBJECT LESSON
The story of IP's and SPDR's provides an opportunity to consider the
limitations of the traditional coverage analysis and to assess the new analysis.
In the IP case, Judge Easterbrook began by finding that IP's could be
considered securities under the statutory language that includes 'any ...
privilege on any ... index of securities (including any interest ... based
on the value thereof)' and 'in general, any instrument commonly known as
a "security". . . ."4 He rejected the argument that IP's are "stock" because
they do not represent an equity interest in anything. 49 Similarly, he found
that an IP is not a 'certificate of interest or participation in ... any of
the foregoing' because it represents a value based on something but not in
something.1I °
He also found that IP's could be futures because they require the short
to pay a value to be fixed at a date in the future and may be settled by
entering into offsetting obligations.' Judge Easterbrook conceded that IP's
do not possess every characteristic of traditional futures contracts, such as
indefinite duration and bilateralism.5 2 He concluded that IP's have char-
acteristics of both securities and futures, noting that they were designed to
do so.15
After a brief excursus into administrative law, Judge Easterbrook de-
cided that administrative principles of deference do not provide a solution
to this quandary because both the SEC and the CFTC are arguably entitled
to deference on the scope of a statute they administer. 54 Following the
hierarchy set out in the Exchange Act and the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA), Judge Easterbrook concluded that if an instrument is a future, the
CFTC's jurisdiction is exclusive. 55
Finally, Judge Easterbrook declined to look to the purposes of the
Exchange Act or the CEA in deciding whether IP's are covered by the
securities laws. First, he concluded that both Acts define their coverage by
the attributes of the instruments rather than the persons involved.5 6 He
then noted that although the Supreme Court has sometimes looked at
legislative purpose in securities coverage cases, doing so in this case did not
support securities coverage. 157 Rather, he posited an IP based upon a
148. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 545-46.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 546.
154. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission participated in the case only as
amicus curie, id. at 539, perhaps raising an issue of whether the court had a second agency
to defer to.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 549 (citing Landreth). This is certainly a narrow reading of Landreth and one
that was repudiated in Reves, if not by Landreth itself.
157. Id.
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commodities index rather than a stock index. In such an instance, the CFTC
should be the regulator; by extension, the CFTC should regulate IPs.'1
In looking at Judge Easterbrook's opinion under the traditional analysis,
the point is not so much that he is wrong (although he may be),5 9 but that
the current analysis, even skillfully applied, is inadequate to provide a
relatively determinate result.
Some IP purchasers would have been unsophisticated individuals. Others
would have been sophisticated individuals; still others institutional investors.
A part of the SEC's concern in approving IPs was that they would have
been marketed to individual investors. 6' The Commission took pains to
ensure that such investors would have been protected. 16 Under the tradi-
tional analysis, IP purchasers would have been investors in securities who
expected the securities laws to apply and therefore needed the protection of
those laws.
The traditional analysis also does nothing to resolve the question of
securities laws coverage in the face of a competing regulatory scheme. The
Court in Weaver simply noted the federal insurance aspect of certificates
of deposit and held that the securities laws did not apply, even though
securities were involved. Daniel relied on ERISA as an alternative ground
for holding that the instrument was not a security. The Reves case (decided
after Chicago Mercantile Exchange) characterized the test as being whether
the other regulatory scheme reduces the risk of the instrument such that
securities law protection is unnecessary. Both the FDIC and ERISA provi-
sions reduce risk. The CEA and the CFTC would have done nothing to
reduce the risk of IPs; they would have provided an alternative regulatory
body, if desired. In sum, considering investor protection simply does not
help much in deciding whether IPs should have been covered by the securities
laws. It does not help at all in deciding whether the securities laws should
have applied in the face of the CEA.
Applying the public interest test to IPs yields a more rational analysis
and may result in a finding that the securities laws should govern. First,
IPs would have helped the trading markets financially by adding to liquidity,
allowing for risk allocation, and reducing volatility. 62 This test supports
158. Id. at 549-50.
159. First, Judge Easterbrook glosses over other categories in the definition of security
that might fit IPs, such as receipt for the interests, certificate of deposit for a security, and
investment contract. Index Participation Rule Change, supra note 5, at 15,285 n.47. Second,
the Commission made a strong case that an instrument that lacks futurity is not a future. Id.
at 15,286-89. Third, Judge Easterbrook may be misreading the statutes in holding that if IPs
are partially futures they are futures for purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act and
therefore subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. Perhaps Congress meant the
categories to be mutually exclusive. In other words, perhaps the question is not whether IPs
are partly futures, but whether they are more future than security. See also supra note 156.
160. So called "retail" investors. See Index Participation Rule Change, supra note 5, at
15,286-89.
161. Id. at 15,292.
162. Id. at 15,290.
REINVENTING A SECURITY
coverage. Second, capital formation would not have been fostered because
no capital would have passed to an issuer to be used for production of
goods and services. As Judge Easterbrook notes, IPs are not interests in
anything. This test, then, militates against securities coverage.
Third, instruments similar to IPs were and are being traded abroad. 63
American markets have lost capital by not offering IPs. Judge Easterbrook
admitted as much but held that consideration irrelevant under the traditional
coverage analysis. Regulation would have ensured that IPs were offered and
would thus have helped to attract and retain capital in the American markets.
Market regulation reasons also support securities coverage for IPs.
Without coverage they would either have been unregulated or regulated by
the CFTC. Because IPs were in many ways functionally equivalent to stock
index futures (regulated by the CFTC), the danger of disparate regulation
existed. Looking first to whether the CFTC or the SEC would have been
the better regulator, virtually all commentators agree that the SEC is
better.'" Second, unlike ERISA or the FDIA, the CEA does not reduce the
risk of instruments under its regulation.'65 The presence of the CFTC, then,
would not have reduced the risks that the securities laws were designed to
prevent.
Considering the question of market integrity, securities coverage of IPs
would have fostered antimanipulation goals. Market participants could not
have taken advantage of a lack of regulation to manipulate IPs by, for
example, frontrunning customer orders.' 66 As the regulatory scandals in-
volving the futures markets attest, the CFTC is not superior to the SEC in
maintaining market integrity. 67
Turning to the question of the financial oversight of market participants,
the SEC, in its release approving IPs spelled out the controls it would have
163. See Kevin 0. Salwen & William Power, After-Hours Big Board Trading: How It
Will Work, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1991, at Cl, C19 ("Basket trades [at least 15 stocks] are
a main reason the Big Board is getting into this after-hours game.... Large investors often
take their trades to London, where they can trade cheaply and with more anonymity than in
New York. But the Big Board wants their business back, so it has set aside a session just for
them").
164. Chiappinelli, supra note 87, at 172. In 1989, a federal undercover investigation of
widespread trading fraud led to 48 indictments on the two largest exchanges regulated by the
CFTC. The indictments led critics to "wonder just what the watchdog was watching." Kevin
G. Salwen, SEC Seeking Hostile Takeover of CFTC's Power to Regulate Financial Markets,
Is Favored to Win, WAL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1990, at A16; see also Foust, supra note 122, at
43 (referring to "notoriously lax CFTC"); McMurray, supra note 122, at Cl (pointing out
that CFTC is "widely viewed as less stringent than SEC"); Salwen & McMurray, supra note
121, at Cl (noting that Chicago exchanges have long been perceived as being weaker in policing
than are stock exchanges).
165. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
166. A broker-dealer frontruns when he or she trades in advance of, and with knowledge
of, an impending customer order that is expected to change the market price.
167. Salwen, supra note 164, at A16.
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placed upon IPs and traders to ensure that neither the market participants
trading IPs nor the clearing and settlement participants exposed themselves
to excessive or unmonitored financial risk. 1' Because most, if not all, of
the traders and intermediaries of IPs would have been registered broker-
dealers already subject to SEC oversight, this criterion suggests that securities
coverage be extended to IPs as well.
Applying the traditional analysis to SPDRs is straightforward. Although
the statute does not expressly define interests in trusts as securities, a SPDR
is surely a "certificate of interest or participation in" a security. Section
2(2) of the Securities Act provides further evidence by defining "person"
to include a trust only where the interests in the trust are evidenced by a
security. 6 9 SPDRs probably also fall within the definition of an investment
contract under Howey.170 Unlike IPs, SPDRs have no element of futurity
because the purchase or sale is completed in the present and the buyer and
seller have no further obligations to one another. SPDRs are, then, surely
not subject to being labeled futures. Because SPDRs are to be sold to
individual investors, and no other regulatory scheme would reduce the risk
of SPDRs, the protection of investors would require that they be covered
by the securities acts.
The public interest definition of a security would apply to SPDRs as it
did to IPs except that the CEA does not provide an alternative regulator
to balance against the regulation by the SEC. Under this test, the American
markets would obviously benefit from regulating SPDRs as securities.
Comparing IPs and SPDRs under both analyses points out the problems
with the traditional test for securities coverage that were illustrated in
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. A vehicle that allows individuals to invest
easily in the S&P 500 index should have been available in 1989. The costs
incurred because of the delay can be described in several ways. First are
the transactional costs of the American Stock Exchange and others in
developing and defending IPs and SPDRs; costs that could have been greatly
reduced. Second is the administrative and judicial time spent in analyzing
IPs and, presumably, SPDRs. Third, investors, market participants, and
intermediaries have been damaged by the delay in introducing either IPs or
SPDRs; all these groups lost profits by being unable to trade in the new
instruments. Fourth, the American trading markets were less efficient than
they otherwise would have been because investors were denied an easy way
to invest in the S&P 500. Finally, those markets were harmed because the
functional equivalent of IPs has been traded abroad. All these costs would
have been avoided or reduced had the public interest definition been applied
to IPs in 1989.
168. Index Participation Rule Change, supra note 5, at 15,292-93.
169. 2 Loss & SEUGMoAN, supra note 23, at 1060-64.
170. That is, they are an investment in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation
of profit to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. See supra
notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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As this exercise in analysis shows, two fundamental dangers exist in
ignoring the public interest when determining the scope of securities laws
coverage. First, and more importantly, ignoring the public interest leaves
the capital markets at risk. That risk is both financial and regulatory.
Further, the ability of American capital markets to attract and retain capital
against increasing competition from foreign markets is undercut by ignoring
the public interest when determining securities coverage. Second, the tradi-
tional calculus is not useful in predicting whether coverage will be imposed
and it effects only part of Congress's intention in enacting the securities
laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
The traditional analysis of securities laws coverage is simply inadequate
when applied to many new investment vehicles. The IP and SPDR story is
an example of the problems created by continuing to hew to the existing
criteria. Courts need to consider the larger, national implications of securities
coverage. The implications involve improving the capital markets, American
competitiveness in world financial markets, and market regulation. Ignoring
these concerns can only make the question of coverage more indeterminate
and can only hurt the American securities markets and in the end the
American economy as a whole.
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